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CASE NOTES
Arbitration of International Securities Transactions—Scherk v.
Alberto-Culver Co.'—Alberto-Culver Co., an American corporation,
contracted with Fritz Scherk, a German national, to purchase three
of his European-based enterprises. 2
 Scherk was contractually obli-
gated to convert his enterprises into stock companies. Consequently,
the purchase was executed in the form of a securities transaction. 3
An important object of the transaction was the transfer to Alberto-
Culver of all rights held by the Scherk enterprises in trademarks of
cosmetic goods. 4
 To effectuate this object, the contracts contained
warranties whereby Scherk guaranteed the "sole and unencumbered
ownership" of the trademarks. 5
 The Contracts also contained clauses
which provided that, if requested by either party, any controversy
arising out of the transaction would be settled exclusively by arbi-
tration before the Interhational Chamber of Commerce in Paris,
France. 6
 The laws of the State of Illinois were chosen to govern the
interpretation and enforcement of the contracts.'
After closing the transaction, Alberto-Culver allegedly discov-
ered that the trademark rights were subject to substantial encum-
brances. 8
 Contending that Scherk's fraudulent representations con-
cerning the status of the trademarks violated section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the 1934 Act), 9
 and Rule 10b-5 10
promulgated thereunder, Alberto-Culver brought an action for
damages and other relief in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois." Scherk filed a formal request for
417 U,S. 506 (1974).
2
 Id. at 508,
3
 Alberto-Culver Co. v. Scherk, 484 F.2d 611, 613 (7th Cir, 1973).
417 U.S. at 508.
5 Id.
Id. The arbitration clause relating to the transfer of one of the Scherk enterprises read
in its entirety, as follows:
The parties agree that if any controversy or claim shall arise out of this agreement or
the breach thereof and either party shall request that the matter shall be settled by
arbitration, the matter shall be settled exclusively by arbitration in accordance with
the rules then obtaining of the International Chamber of Commerce, Paris, France,
by a single arbitrator, if the parties shall agree upon one, or by one arbitrator
appointed by each party and a third arbitrator appointed by the other arbitrators. In
case of any failure of a party to make an appointment referred to above within four
weeks after notice of the controversy, such appointment shall be made by said
Chamber. All arbitration proceedings shall be held in Paris, France, and each party
agrees to comply in all respects with any award made in any such proceeding and to
the entry of a judgment in any jurisdiction upon any award rendered in such
proceeding. The laws of the State of Illinois, U.S.A. shall apply to and govern this
agreement, its interpretation and performance.
Id. at 508 n.l.
7
 Id. at 508.
8 Id. at 509.
9 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970).
'° 17 C.F.R. § 240.1013-5 (1974).
" 417 U.S. at 509; 484 F.2d at 614.
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arbitration with the International Chamber of Commerce, 12 and
then filed a motion with the district court to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction, or alternatively, to stay the action pending an arbitra-
tion in accordance with the terms of the contracts. 13 The district
court found it had jurisdiction," denied Scherk's motion," and
granted Alberto-Culver a preliminary order enjoining Scherk from
proceeding with arbitration."
On interlocutory appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit affirmed" relying upon the 1953 Supreme Court
decision in Wilko v. Swan. 18 The holding in Wilko was that agree-
ments to arbitrate future controversies are void because such agree-
ments waive the right of a securities purchaser to have his dispute
decided in a judicial forum." Reversing the decision of the court of
appeals, the Supreme Court found Wilko inapplicable to interna-
tional securities transactions and HELD: 2° An agreement to arbi-
trate controversies arising out of an international securities transac-
tion is to be enforced by the United States federal courts as required
by the Arbitration Act. 2 '
Scherk provided an opportunity for the Supreme Court to re-
examine Wilko v. Swan, where it held that an arbitration agree-
ment22 in a contract involving a domestic securities transaction23
was void under provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 (the 1933,
Act). 24 In Wilko, the Court found that the 1933 Act provides the
securities purchaser with the right to have his dispute resolved in a
judicial forum 25 and invalidates any agreement which operates as a
waiver of that right. 2  Consequently, an arbitration agreement is
void under the Act because it constitutes such a waiver. 27 In Wilko,
however, the Court also implicitly conceded that the Arbitration Act
la 417 U.S. at 510 n.2.
13 Id. at 509.
14 484 F.2d at 612.
15 417 U.S. at 510.
$6 Id.
L7 484 F.2d at 614-15.
346 U.S. 427 (1953).
' 9 Id. at 432-35..
2° 417 U.S. at 519-20.
21 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1970).
22
 The term "arbitration agreement" is used consistently in this note to refer to an
agreement to arbitrate controversies that may arise in the future. An agreement to arbitrate a
controversy which already exists is denominated a "submission to arbitration" or "submis-
sion."
13
 The Supreme Court in Wilko did not distinguish between domestic and international
transactions. See 484 F.2d at 615.
24 346 U.S. at 432-35. The provisions which the Court construed were 15 U.S.C. §§ 77n,
77v(a) (1970).
25 346 U.S. at 431.




of 1925 28 mandates the enforcement of arbitration agreements. 29
Thus, the Court's analysis posited the existence of a conflict between
the Securities Act and the Arbitration Act which could only be
resolved by choosing to effectuate the policy of either one statute or
the other. 3 ° Essentially the same conflict was present in Scherk. 3 '
Since the Court, in Scherk, assumed the existence of a conflict
between the Arbitration Act and the securities statutes and chose to
effectuate the policy of the Arbitration Act rather than that of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 32
 it was required to distinguish
Wilko. The Court has been importuned to regard the Wilko holding
as resting merely upon a gross disparity of either bargaining power
or knowledge between a seller and a purchaser of securities. 33 In
Scherk, however, the Court explicitly declined to rely upon the
disparity in bargaining power rationale in distinguishing Wiao. 34
Instead, it distinguished Wilko on the basis that there, the dispute to
be arbitrated arose from a domestic transaction, whereas the dispute
in Scherk arose from an international transaction. 35
In this note, the Court's reasoning in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver
Co. and Wilko v. Swan will be examined to determine the extent to
which the distinction between international and domestic transac-
tions provides a sound basis for deciding whether an agreement to
arbitrate a controversy arising out of a securities transaction should
be invalidated or enforced by a federal court. An alternative crite-
rion for enforcement based on a view of the arbitration clause as a
severable, bargained-for agreement will be presented. Finally, the
capability of the alternative criterion to overcome the apparent
conflict between the Arbitration Act and the securities statutes while
promoting both statutory policies will be suggested.
The distinction between international and domestic transac-
tions does not resolve the issue raised by the statutory construction
of provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 undertaken by the Court
28 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1970).
29 See 346 U.S. at 431, 438.
3 ° Id. at 438.
31 The Court did not explicitly analyze Scherk as involving a conflict between the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Arbitration Act. Moreover, it did not seem to regard
the securities aspect of the transaction as important. See 417 U.S. at 517-18. However, all the
essential factors which constituted the conflict in Wilko were present in Scherk. The court of
appeals held the transaction in Scherk to be a securities transaction, 484 F.2d at 615, and this
ruling was not assigned as error on appeal to the Supreme Court. 417 U.S. at 514 n.8. The
Court also accepted arguendo that the language of the Securities Act of 1933 which conflicts
with the enforcement of an arbitration agreement is also contained in the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934. Id. itt. 515. Moreover, the Court's attempt to distinguish Wilko would appear to
be irrelevant if the conflict were not, at least, latently present in Scherk.
32 15 U.S.C. 11§ 78a-7Sjj (1970) thereinafter referred to as the 1934 Act]. See 417 U.S. at
513. See note 31 supra.
33 417 U.S. at 512 n.6. See Brief for American Arbitration Ass'n as Amicus Curiae at 11
n.4, 12, Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974); 484 F.2d at 617 (dissenting
opinion),
34 417 U.S. at 512 n.6,
35
 Id. at 515.
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in Wilko. In Wilko, the Court held an arbitration agreement invalid
under the anti-waiver provision of the 1933 Act, 36 because such an
agreement waives the rights of the purchaser under the Act's venue
provision37
 to choose from a wide selection of forums and to have
the dispute resolved in a judicial proceeding." The venue 39
 and
anti-waiver" provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the
statute applicable to the Scherk case, are so similar to those of the
1933 Act that there appears to be no relevant basis for distinction. 41
Although the Scherk Court offered a pair of "colorable" arguments
to differentiate the anti-waiver and venue provisions of the 1933 and
1934 Acts, 42
 it accepted arguendo the premise "that the operative
36
 15 U.S.C, § 77n (1970), which provides: Any condition, stipulation, or provision
binding any person acquiring any security to waive compliance with any provision of this
subchapter or of the rules and regulations of the Commission shall be void."
37
 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (1970), which provides in pertinent part:
The district courts of the United States, and the United States courts of any
Territory, shall have jurisdiction of offenses and violations under this sub-chapter
and under the rules and regulations promulgated by the [Securities and Exchange]
Commission in respect thereto, and, concurrent with State and Territorial courts, of
all suits in equity and actions at law brought to enforce any liability or duty created
by this sub-chapter. Any such suit or action may be brought in the district wherein
the defendant is found or is an inhabitant or transacts business, or in the district
where the offer or sale took place, if the defendant participated therein . . . . No case
arising under this sub-chapter and brought in any state court of competent jurisdic-
tion shall be removed to any court of the United States. . . .
38
 346 U.S. at 434-37. For a critical analysis of the conclusion that an arbitration
agreement violates the anti-waiver provisions of the securities statutes, see text at notes 101-03
infra.
39
 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1970), which provides in pertinent part:
The district courts of the United States, and the United States courts of any
Territory or other place subject to the jurisdiction•of the United States shall have
exclusive jurisdiction of violations of this chapter or the rules and regulations
thereunder, and of all suits in equity and actions at law brought to enforce any
liability or duty created by this chapter or the rules and regulations thereunder...
Any suit or action to enforce any liability or duty created by this chapter or rules and
regulations thereunder, or to enjoin any violation of such chapter or rules and
regulations, may be brought in any such district or in the district wherein the
defendant is found or is an inhabitant or transacts business .
" 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a) (1970), which provides: Any condition, stipulation, or provision
binding any person to waive compliance with any provision of this chapter or of any rule or
regulation thereunder, or of any rule of an exchange required thereby shall be void."
484 F.2d at 616, 618 (dissenting opinion). Comparison of the anti-waiver provisions of
the 1933 and 1934 Acts reveals only one difference: the 1933 Act voids waivers executed by
persons acquiring securities while the 1934 Act voids waivers executed by anyone. See notes
36 and 40 supra.
42
 The Court first ascribed significance to the fact that the purchaser's private remedy in
Wilk° was established by § 12(2) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1970), which has no
counterpart in the 1934 Act. 417 U.S. at 513. However, the private remedy invoked by
Alberto-Culver was inferred from § 10(b) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970), and Rule
10b-5 promulgated thereunder, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1974). See 6 L. Loss, Securities
Regulation 3869-73 (1969) and cases cited therein. Thus, the distinction seems to be between •
private remedies explicitly and implicitly created by statute. The Court offered no explanation
why arbitration would be a satisfactory method for resolving a dispute the remedy for which
was implicitly created by statute while it would be an unsatisfactory method for resolving a
dispute the remedy for which was explicitly created by statute. See text at notes 47-62 infra.
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portions of the language of the 1933 Act relied upon in Wilko are
contained in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 . . . ." 43 Thus, the
enforceability of an agreement to arbitrate disputes arising from a
securities transaction does not depend upon which securities statute
,constitutes the basis of the plaintiff's claim."
There appears to be no provision in the securities statutes
which would support the contention that the treatment of transac-
tions subject to the statutes should differ, depending on whether the
transactions are international or domestic in character. Specifically,
the anti-waiver provisions do not contain language which would
restrict the invalidation of waivers of statutory rights to those waiv-
ers executed by parties to domestic securities transactions. 45
Moreover, the cases in which international securities transactions
have been the subject of litigation under the securities statutes
suggest that once those statutes are found to govern the transaction,
they are applied in their full effectiveness, not in a watered-down
ve rsion. 46
It is submitted that the distinction between international and
domestic transactions is not relevant to the policy considerations
which compelled the Court, in Wilko, to adopt its construction of
the venue and anti-waiver provisions of the 1933 Act. The Court
recognized that one of the necessary effects of an arbitration agree-
ment is to foreclose the securities purchaser's opportunity to have
the dispute resolved in a judicial proceeding. 47 Upon examining the
arbitration process and implicitly contrasting it with the judicial
process in order to determine the impact of the purchaser's waiver of
judicial proceedings, 48 the Court found arbitration to be legally less
certain than a law suit." The potential for misinterpretation and
misapplication of legal rules- is greater in arbitral than in judicial
proceedings, since the arbitration tribunal need not be composed of
persons knowledgeable in the applicable laws° and since the Arbi-
The Court then suggested that the venue provision of the 1933 Act offers the plaintiff a
wider choice of forums than does the venue provision of the 1934 Act. 417 U.S. at 514. This
proposition is debatable; a district court has labelled the venue provision of the 1934 Act
"broader" than that of the 1933 Act. Puma v. Marriott, 294 F. Supp. 1116, 1121 (D. Del.
1969). Compare 15 U.S.C. 77v(a) (1970), quoted in note 37 supra, with 15 U.S.C. § 78aa
(1970), quoted in note 39 supra. Moreover, the comparative breadth of the venue provisions
would not seem significant; it should suffice that the venue provision of the 1934 Act provides
a wide choice of forums and that the right to exercise that choice is waived by an arbitration
agreement.
43 417 U.S. at 515.
44
 Reader v. Hirsch& Co., 197 F. Supp. 111 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). Cf. Moran v. Paine,
Webber, Jackson & Curtis, 389 F.2d 242, 245 (3d Cir. 1968).
45 See notes 36 and 40 supra.
•	 46 See, e.g., Lease° Data Processing Equip, Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1335-37
(2d Cir. 1972); Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 215, 219-20 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
395 U.S. 906 (1969).
47 -346 U.S. at 435.
46 Id. at 435-37.
4° Id. at 435-36.
3 ° The selection of the arbitrators rests in the hands of the parties to the arbitration
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tration Act contains no machinery through which arbitrators may
elicit judicial instruction on the law. 5 ' Moreover, a court is more
likely to decide the case solely according to the statutory criteria,
while the arbitration tribunal may inject into its decision-making
such extra-statutory criteria as the customary practices in the
trade. 52
 Thus, the arbitration award may insufficiently reflect and
effectuate the purchaser's rights under the securities statutes."
From both a practical and legal standpoint, judicial review is
less likely to be capable of rectifying a legally incorrect arbitral
award than a legally incorrect judgment. 54 Arbitrators are not re-
quired to explain their reasons for making an award, 55 nor are they
required to ensure that a complete record of the proceeding is
kept. 56
 In addition, arbitrators will not usually be heard in court to
impeach their own award. 57 Thus, reviewing courts face practical
difficulties in ascertaining the arbitrators' interpretations of the law.
Moreover, the criterion for vacating an arbitral award is not the
presence of legal error58 but rather a manifest disregard of the law
by the arbitrators: 59 for example, where the arbitrator correctly
understood the applicable law but rendered the award in disregard
of it." Thus, even if the reviewing court is able to ascertain the
presence and nature of legal error in an award, it may not be
empowered to vacate that award.
It would appear that the Wilko Court was primarily concerned
with the possibility that the agreement to resolve the dispute by
arbitration may be tantamount to a waiver of the effective applica-
tion of the substantive provisions of the Securities Act. 6 ' Thus, the
securities purchaser's venue provision right to have his dispute
resolved in a judicial, rather than arbitral, proceeding can be more
agreement; thus, the parties themselves determine whether legally knowledgeable arbitrators
are selected. See M. Domke, The Law and Practice of Commercial Arbitration § 1.01, at I
(1968) [hereinafter cited as Domke].
51 See 346 U.S. at 436.
52 One of the frequently cited advantages of commercial arbitration is that persons
knowledgeable in the practices and customs of the trade can be chosen to resolve the dispute.
E.g., Mentschikoff, The Significance of Arbitration—a Preliminary Inquiry, 17 Law &
Contemp. Prob. 698, 701, 707 (1952). The injection of arbitrators' conceptions of what
constitutes fair dealing in the trade into the arbitral decision-making process would appear to
be inappropriate where legislation has been enacted for the purpose of altering the patterns of
practice in the trade. See Wilko v. Swan, 201 F.2d 439, 445 (2d Cir. 1953) (dissenting
opinion).
53 346 U.S. at 435-36.
54 Id. at 436-37.
55 Id. at 436.
56 Id.
57 See Domke, supra note 50, § 23.02, at 227-28.
5° Amicizia Societa Navegazione v. Chilean Nitrate & Iodine Corp., 274 F.2d 805, 808
(2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 843 (1960).
19 274 F.2d at 808. Cf. 346 U.S. at 436.
6° San Martine Compania De Navigacion v. Saguenay Terminals Ltd., 293 F.2d 796,
801 (9th Cir. 1961).
6 ' 346 U.S. at 438.
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realistically characterized as the right to the full benefit of the
protections afforded him by the statute rather than merely a right to
have his case heard in a specific forum. 62 Since the potential for
insufficient recognition and effectuation of the statutory rights is
inherent in the arbitration process, the relevance of the Wilko
Court's concerns does not depend on whether the dispute to be
arbitrated arose from an international or a domestic securities trans-
action. 63
Despite the Wilko Court's elaborate critique of the application
of law in arbitration proceedings, it did not hold that all disputes
arising from securities transactions must not be resolved through
arbitration. Rather it held that agreements to arbitrate future con-
troversies arising out of securities transactions will not be en-
forced. 64 The Court explicitly declined to go so far as to invalidate
"submissions" to arbitration65—agreements to arbitrate existing con-
troversies." The decision whether or not to arbitrate involves a
trade-off between the advantages of a comparatively quick and
inexpensive resolution of the dispute and the disadvantage of a
legally less certain resolution. 67
 The Court in Wilko seemed to
suggest that the purchaser is unlikely to be able to make this
trade-off knowledgeably until the presence of a dispute compels him
to assess his legal situation; a pre-dispute agreement to arbitrate,
therefore, takes unfair advantage of his ignorance." Also, the arbi-
tration agreement is likely to be an ancillary provision in the seller's
standard form contract and if the purchaser is to derive the benefits
of the central purposes of the contract, he has little choice but to
adhere to the arbitration agreement. After the dispute arises, how-
ever, the seller has no leverage to coerce the buyer into agreeing to
arbitrate. 69 Thus, the purchaser's position would appear to be sub-
stantially better in negotiating a submission than in negotiating an
arbitration agreement. Since the tactic of using a stronger bargain-
62 484 F.2d at 619 (dissenting opinion).
67 In Scherk the Court virtually ignored, perhaps purposefully, the waiver of judicial
proceedings argument advanced in Wilko. See 417 U.S. at 512-13, 515. The Court may have
considered that its decision to enforce the arbitration agreement on other grounds disposed of
the waiver of judicial proceedings issue. But see text at notes 84-85 infra.
64 346 U.S. at 437-38. See Moran v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, 389 F.2d 242,
246 (3d Cir. 1968); accord, Gardner v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 433 F.2d 367, 368 (5th Cir.
1970) (per curiam).
65 346 U.S. at 437, 438. See note 22 supra.
' 66 Obviously, a submission to arbitration is also an agreement which waives the right to
have the dispute resolved in a judicial proceeding. See 484 F.2d at 618 n.7 (dissenting
opinion).
67 See 346 U.S. at 438.
64 Id. at 435.
69
 After the dispute has arisen, the only thing to negotiate is how the dispute is to be
resolved. The purchaser may be in a stronger bargaining position than the seller. If the
purchaser refuses to agree to submit the dispute to arbitration, he can use the venue
provision's wide choice of forum to subject the seller to the expense and inconvenience of
litigation in a remote forum. See Note, 62 Yale L.J. 985, 987 (1953).
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ing position to gain unfair advantage is neither always absent in
international transactions nor always present in domestic transac-
tions, the distinction between domestic and international transac-
tions is irrelevant to the evil which Wilko is designed to avoid—the
forced or unknowing pre-dispute waiver of the right to have con-
troversies resolved in a judicial forum.
However, the distinction between international and domestic
transactions is relevant to the decision whether to enforce an agree-
ment to arbitrate where the focus is confined to the pre-dispute,
forum-selection aspect of the arbitration agreement. The agreement
in both Wilko and Scherk was to arbitrate future controversies
before a specified tribunal." Thus, as the Court in Scherk noted,''
one of the beneficial functions of the agreement was to select in
advance the forum in which any dispute would be resolved. ,72
The policy considerations which underlie the enforcement of
forum-selection clauses in international transactions were first ex-
pounded in 1971 in The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co. 73 There,
the Supreme Court recognized that a forum-selection clause in an
international contract provides the essential elements of orderliness
and predictability to the transaction." An international transaction
is likely to have sufficient contacts with several countries so that
jurisdiction may be legitimately exercised by each. 75 By selecting a •
forum in advance, the parties to the transaction can ensure that any
disputes which arise will be submitted to a neutral forum familiar
with the problem area involved 76 and relatively convenient to both
parties. 77 By enforcing forum-selection clauses, courts discourage
international forum-shopping and the concomitant "mutually de-
structive jockeying by the parties to secure tactical litigation advan7
tages."78 Enforcement, moreover, enables courts to avoid conflict of
laws problems which arise when the courts of several countries have
attempted to exercise jurisdiction over the international commercial
dispute. 79 Thus, the Court has concluded that the "parochial con-
70
 The Scherk arbitration agreement designated the International Chamber of Commerce
in Paris, France, as the arbitral tribunal. See note 6 supra. The arbitration agreement in
Wilk() designated several arbitral tribunals from which the investor could select. Wilko v.
Swan, 107 F. Supp. 75, 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
71




 407 U.S. 1 (1971).
74 Id. at 13.14. Accord, 417 U.S. at 516.
75
 417 U.S. at 516-17.
76
 407 U.S. at 12. See 417 U.S. at 51.6.
77
 407 U.S. at 13.
75 417 U.S. at 517.
79
 Id. at 516-17. The Court alluded to this in Scherk by suggesting that Scherk could
have obtained "an -order in France or some other country enjoining Alberto-Culver from
proceeding with its litigation in the United States." Id. at 517, This example, however, may
be inappropriate. Under the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards, [1970] 3 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, implemented in the United States
by 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-08 (1970), the courts of the country in which suit is brought may refuse to
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cept that all disputes must be resolved under our laws and in our
courts ..."B° is counterproductive to stability in international trans-
actions and may adversely affect the "willingness and ability of
businessmen to enter into international commercial agreernents." 81
Accordingly, in The Bremen, it held that forum-selection clauses in
international contracts are "prima facie valid and should be en-
forced unless enforcement is shown by the resisting party to be
`unreasonable' under the circumstances." 82
This forum-selection analysis, which was explicitly followed in
Scherk," does not fully justify the Scherk Court's failure to cope
with the policy considerations which compelled the Court in Wilko
to invalidate an agreement to arbitrate disputes arising out of a
securities transaction." In The Bremen, the Court noted that "[a]
contractual choice-of-forum clause should be held unenforceable if
enforcement would contravene a strong public policy of the forum in
which suit is brought, whether declared by statute or by judicial
decision."85 It would therefore seem to have been incumbent upon
the Court in Scherk to indicate why the public policy of Wilko does
not render the arbitration agreement, even viewed solely as a
forum-selection clause, unenforceable.
The forgoing analysis of the Court's reasoning in Wilko and
Scherk suggests that the distinction between domestic and interna-
tional transactions may not provide an adequate basis for the judi-
cial decision whether to enforce an agreement to arbitrate controver-
sies arising out of a securities transaction. However, a contract
analysis may provide an adequate basis for that decision.
Viewing the arbitration clause as a severable, bargained-for
agreement within the contract provides an alternative analytic
framework for deciding whether to enforce or invalidate an agree-
ment to arbitrate any dispute arising from a securities transaction.
Section 2 of the Arbitration Act of 1925 86
 provides for application of
a contract analysis in determining the enforceability of arbitration
agreements: "A written provision in . . a contract evidencing a
enforce an arbitration agreement that is void under their municipal law. Art. V(2)(b).
Moreover, it appears from the Convention that only the courts of the country in which suit is
brought are empowered to determine the enforceability of the agreement to arbitrate. Art.
V(2). Thus, an injunction by the courts of another signatory nation would be an usurpation of
the rights accorded the courts of the United States by the Convention. A more appropriate
example would have been the situation in The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1
(1971). There, the courts of England took jurisdiction over the dispute on the grounds that
jurisdiction was conferred on them by the forum-selection clause. Id. at 4. Had the courts of
the United States refused to enforce the forum-selection clause, the cowls of both countries
would have claimed jurisdiction to resolve that dispute.
s° 407 U.S. at 9.
8I 417 U.S. at 517. See 407 U.S. at 9,
$2
 407 U.S. at 10.
83 417 U.S. at 518-19.
'14 Sec text at notes 49 - 63 supra.
" 407 U.S. at 15.
" 9 U.S.C. $§ 1-14 (1970).
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transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a con-
troversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction . . .
shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds
as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 87
Article II of the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards88 also provides for the application of con-
tract principles. An arbitration agreement subject to the Convention
is to be enforced unless it is "null and void, inoperative or incapable
of being performed . . "89 or concerns a "subject matter [not]
capable of settlement by arbitration." 9° The Arbitration Act recog-
nizes that arbitration agreements are an "allowable extension of the
sphere of contract" 9 i and mandates that such agreements be en-
forced on the same basis as other contracts.
When the enforcement of an arbitration agreement is chal-
lenged, the agreement should be severed from the rest of the con-
tract and its validity determined based on its own merits as a
contract. 92
 The severability of the arbitration clause is already rec-
ognized. For example, where a party seeks to avoid arbitration on
the ground of fraudulent inducement, he must show that the arbi-
tration agreement itself, not the contract as a whole, was fraudulently
induced." This rationale can easily be extended to such contract
defenses as duress, illegality, overreaching and void as against pub-
lic policy." The arbitration clause should also be severed from the
rest of the contract in order to determine whether it has been the
87
 Id. § 2 (1970).
88 [1970] 3 U.S.T.- 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, implemented in the United States by 9
U.S.C. §§ 201-08 (1970).
84 Art. 11(3).
" Art. II(1).
41 Carlston, Theory of the Arbitration Process, 17 Law & Contemp. Prob. 631 (1952).
92
 The procedural provisions of the Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 3, 4, 206 (1970), seem to
be designed to focus the court's attention on the arbitration clause. When a party to a
proceeding in a federal court moves to stay the proceeding until an arbitration has been
completed, the court's inquiry is limited to determining whether: (1) an issue in the proceeding
is referable to arbitration under a written arbitration agreement; and (2) the movant is in
default in proceeding with arbitration. Id. § 3. When a party seeks an order to compel
arbitration, the principal issue before the court is the "making of the arbitration agreement
'[and] the failure, neglect, or refusal to perform the same . . . ." Id. § 4. Thus, severing the
arbitration clause from the rest of the contract accurately defines the proper scope of the
inquiry under the summary procedures of the Arbitration Act.
93 Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 403-04 (1967); Robert
Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402, 410-11 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. granted,
362 U.S. 909, cert. dismissed pursuant to stipulation, 364 U.S 801 (1960).
94 Courts should be somewhat reluctant to hold void, as against public policy, those
arbitration agreements which are subject to the Convention on the Recognition and Enforce-
ment of Foreign Arbitral Awards. "If the United States is overready to defeat, on public
policy grounds, an international arbitration agreement sought to be enforced by a foreign
contracting party, it must expect its own nationals to be subject to the same treatment in the
courts of foreign enforcing countries." Brief for the American Arbitration Ass'n as Amicus
Curiae at 16, Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974). See Parsons & Whittemore
Overseas Co. v. Societe Generale de L'Industrie du Papier, Doc. Nos. 74-1642, 74-1676 (2d
Cir. Dec. 23, 1974) at 1046-48.
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subject of an actual agreement between the parties; if it has not
been the subject of an actual agreement between the parties, it
should be held that no contract to arbitrate was formed. 95
The arbitration clause at issue in Wilko was one of seventeen
fine print clauses in the brokerage firm's standard form margin
contract. 96 There is no indication that the clause was the subject of
an actual agreement between the parties. Also, if the margin con-
tract was offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, the arbitration
agreement was consummated through the brokerage firm's exercise
of grossly superior bargaining power. 97 Viewed as a severable,
bargained-for agreement, the enforcement of the arbitration clause
in Wilko reasonably could have been denied.
The decision to enforce the Scherk arbitration clause was cor-
rect under the contract analysis. Since Wilko invalidates only
agreements to arbitrate future disputes, and does not invalidate
submissions to arbitration, 98
 it can be inferred that securities trans-
actions do not involve a subject matter inherently incapable of
resolution by arbitration. The arbitration agreement in Scherk was
apparently the subject of actual bargaining between parties of rela-
tively equal bargaining power. 99 The prolonged period of negotia-
tion i" suggests that both parties were afforded the opportunity to
assess the relative merits of litigating or arbitrating any dispute that
might arise. The contractual analysis would mandate the enforce-
ment of the Scherk arbitration agreement. 1 ° 1
95 Commercial arbitration is a contractual proceeding and derives its legal validity from
the consent of the parties. See Domke, supra note 50, § 1.01, at 1; Carlston, Theory of the
Arbitration Process, 17 Law & Contemp. Prob. 631 (1952). One party's agreement to arbitrate
is consideration for the other party's agreement to arbitrate. Hellenic Lines Ltd. v. Louis
Dreyfus Corp., 249 F. Supp. 526, 530 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), aff'd, 372 F.2d 753 (2d Cir. 1967).
Or, there must be a "meeting of the minds" on the arbitration agreement itself. See Domke,
supra note 50, § 5.01 at 31-36, and the cases cited therein. Cf. Robert Lawrence Co. v.
Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402, 409-11 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. granted, 362 U.S. 909,
cert. dismissed pursuant to stipulation, 364 U.S. 801 (1960). Thus, the principle of mutual
consent as the basis of arbitration is well established. The standard, however, should be
informed consent. An arbitration agreement should be held to have been fraudulently induced
if the party proposing the agreement fails to disclose that an effect of the agreement is to
foreclose the opportunity to have disputes resolved in legally more certain judicial proceed-
ings.
Wilko v. Swan, 201 F.2d 439, 442 (2d Cir, 1953).
97 But see 346 U.S. at 440 (dissenting opinion).
9K See cases cited in note 64 supra.
99 See Brief for American Arbitration Ass'n as Amicus Curiae at 12-13, Scherk v.
Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
417 U.S. at 508-09.
101 Of course, if the Wilko Court's statutory construction of the securities statutes' venue
and anti-waiver provisions is taken literally, the Scherk arbitration agreement would be illegal
under a contract analysis. However, Wilko may be legitimately viewed as extending the literal
coverage of the anti-waiver provisions to deny enforcement of arbitration agreements in
certain situations. 484 F.2d at 619 (dissenting opinion); see text at notes 68-69 supra. Viewed
in isolation, the Wilko statutory construction was poorly conceived. The anti-waiver provision
of the 1933 Act provides: "Any condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person
acquiring any security to waive compliance with any provision of this subchapter or of the
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In Wilko, the Court posited the existence of a conflict between
the securities statutes and the Arbitration Act: the Arbitration Act
mandates the enforcement of arbitration agreements, but arbitration
agreements necessarily waive the plantiff's right to have disputes
resolved in a judicial proceeding—a right which it stated may not be
waived under the securities statutes. The anti-waiver provisions
seem to be designed to prevent the sellers' use of their stronger
bargaining position to contractually deprive buyers of their statutory
rights.' 02 thus, insofar as Wilko was designed to remedy the situa-
tion in which the securities seller uses his greater bargaining power
to deprive the purchaser of the opportunity to have the dispute
resolved in the legally more certain judicial forum, it executed the
congressional intent in enacting the anti-waiver provisions. How-
ever, the Wilko statutory construction operated, until Scherk, as a
conclusive ban on the enforcement of agreements to arbitrate dis-
putes arising out of securities transactions. Since there is no ineluc-
table rule that agreements to arbitrate securities disputes are exe-
cuted from ignorance and weakness, the Wilko invalidation of all
such agreements may be considered overly broad. Insofar as the
Wilko statutory construction invalidates arbitration agreements
knowledgeably executed by parties of comparable bargaining pow-
er, it operates contrary to the intent of Congress that such agree-
ments be "valid, irrevocable and enforceable."'"
In Scherk, the Court chose to distinguish Wilko on the basis of
a distinction between international and domestic transactions. Thus,
Scherk left intact the Wilko ban on the enforcement of agreements
to arbitrate securities disputes in domestic transactions, but lifted
the ban for international transactions. It would appear, therefore,
that Scherk also left undisturbed the Wilko assumption of the exis-
tence of a conflict between the securities statutes and the Arbitration
Act. Apparently, the Court merely found that an arbitration agree-
ment, qua forum-selection clause, promotes practical policy goals in
international transactions which are inapplicable to domestic trans-
actions. °4
rules and regulations of the Commission shall be void." 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1970). However,
"Iwjhat is waived—if the arbitration agreement is enforced—is plaintiff's right to sue rather
than defendant's obligation to comply with the Act. Thus, enforcement of the arbitration
agreement is consistent with a literal reading of the text of [the venue and anti-waiver
provisions]." 484 F.2d at 618 (dissenting opinion). Stated somewhat differently, the anti-
waiver and venue provisions should not be held to provide a non-waivable right to judicial
resolution of a dispute. The anti-waiver provisions should be read to prohibit a party from
extracting an agreement that he need not comply with the substantive provisions of the
securities laws; and the venue provision should be viewed as providing a forum for judicial
resolution if the plaintiff is not barred from litigating the dispute.
102 See 484 F.2d at 616-17 (dissenting opinion).
103
 9 U.S.C• § 2(1970).
104
 The Court in Wilko also recognized that the arbitration agreement pre-selected the
forum in which the dispute was to be resolved; it viewed the forum-selection aspect of
the agreement as a waiver of the purchaser's venue provision "right" to choose from among
the provision's wide selection of forums. 346 U.S. at 435.
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The proposed contract analysis calls for the case-by-case evalu-
ation of the merits of arbitration clauses as severable, bargained-for
agreements. Arbitration agreements executed through the exercise of
grossly disparate bargaining power and knowledge can be invali-
dated through the application of contract principles. The case-by-
case approach permits such egregious agreements to be invalidated
individually. Thus, the overly broad conclusive ban of the Wilko
statutory construction is unnecessary. The case-by-case contract
analysis of agreements to arbitrate securities disputes is capable,
therefore, of effectuating the policies of the securities statutes, as
declared in Wilko, while simultaneously enforcing arbitration
agreements to the extent envisioned by the Arbitration Act.
FRANCIS E. GIBERSON
Securities Law—Rule 106-5—Civil Liability of Tippers and Tip-
pees: Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. '—
Defendant Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. (Merrill
Lynch), and certain of its officers, directors and employees (the
individual defendants) 2
 acquired material inside information3 con-
cerning the unfavorable earnings outlook for Douglas Aircraft Com-
pany, Inc. through Merrill Lynch's position as prospective manag-
ing underwriter for a new issue of Douglas debentures. 4 The indi-
vidual defendants conveyed this information to certain Merrill
Lynch customers 5 (the selling defendants) who, after learning of this
information, either sold from existing positions or made short sales
of more than 165,000 shares of Douglas common on the New York
Stock Exchange (NYSE). 6
 These sales were made prior to a public
announcement of the inside information by Douglas and without
disclosure of the information either to the purchasers of the defen-
dants' stock or to the general investing public. 7
The plaintiffs alleged that they had purchased Douglas com-
mon on the NYSE after the selling defendants had sold and before
495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974).
2 For the names of the individual defendants and their positions with Merrill Lynch, see
id. at 232 n.4.
' This information was essentially that; (1) Douglas would report substantially lower
earnings for the entire first six months than it had reported for the first five months of its 1966
fiscal year; (2) Douglas had sharply lowered its estimate of earnings for its full 1966 fiscal year
since it now expected to have little or no profit for that year; and (3) Douglas had substantially
reduced its projection of earnings for its 1967 fiscal year. Id. at 2-32.
4 Id,
For the names of the selling defendants, most of whom were institutional investors, see
id,
a
 Id. The details of the fact situation are noted in Investors Management Co., Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 9267, reprinted in 11970-71 Transfer Binder) CCH Fed. Sec. L.
Rep., ¶ 78,163, at 80514, 80516-17 (July 29 1971),
7 495 F.2d at 232,
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